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U.S. network industry reforms led other countries in the past, but have recently run into 
difficulties in specific areas. In particular, the U.S. telecommunications sector was hit by a 
deep crisis and electricity reforms suffered under the California disaster. Part of the 
explanation for these difficulties stems from past successful liberalization and deregulation 
experiences in other areas suggesting that competition could provide large benefits to hitherto 
regulated utilities in local telephony and the electricity sector. Part of the explanation lies in 
an underestimate of the coordination problems, resulting in bad institutional design, and in the 
difficulty to deal with vested consumer interests.  
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While sector reforms in network utility industries in the U.S. were viewed as exemplary 
and innovative for a long time, the U.S. has lately been viewed as a laggard (Vogelsang, 
2003) and confidence in the reform process has been badly shaken in the two main 
network industries, telecommunications and electricity. Should we change our views of 
the sector reforms in light of these recent experiences? The current paper successively 
tries to answer the questions, “What happened here?”, “Why did it happen?” and “What 
can be learned for the future and for countries outside the U.S.?” 
The second leitmotif of this paper lies in the semantics of the title. The British economics 
literature has established a fairly precise use of the word privatization (or rather, 
privatisation) in the context of the reform of network industries (and otherwise).   
According to this literature, which is best captured in Armstrong, Cohen and Vickers 
(1994) and Newbery (2000), the sector reform consists of privatization, liberalization and 
(de)regulation. Here, privatization means the sale of public enterprises to private 
shareholders; liberalization means the opening of the markets for competition; regulation 
and  deregulation mean the establishment and reduction of state oversight and of 
constraints on firms in these industries. In contrast, the U.S. literature takes a very broad 
view of privatization as anything that increases the scope of markets relative to command 
and control by governments. This is understandable, since the amount of state ownership 
in U.S. industries was small to begin with and has changed little under the sector reform 
  1movement. Thus, the sale of public enterprises does not deserve to monopolize such a 
valuable and loaded expression as privatization. An analysis of the U.S. privatization in 
the British sense would therefore shed little light on the corresponding non-U.S. 
experience. Rather, because privatization in network industries outside the U.S. involves 
liberalization and (de)regulation as main complementary processes, we concentrate on 
these aspects of the U.S. experience.
1 Network industries worldwide have in common 
that they have gone or are currently going through major reforms. What differentiates 
U.S. reforms from those of other countries is the lack of privatization in the British sense. 
Although a sample of one country does not allow for statistical conclusions, the 
concentration on regulatory and liberalization experiences in the U.S. in comparison with 
the European experience can help develop conjectures about and extract the independent 
influence of the ownership change.
2  
I have discussed the meaning of the word privatization because one of my explanations 
for sector reforms and their success is based on the real effects of words. Economists 
have, for a long time, recognized the power of brand names as carriers of information as 
well as of market power. I want to argue that, in the political sphere, there are similar 
catchwords that one might call political brands or interest group brands. They are not 
real brands because they lack property rights. However, they similarly provide cheap 
political information and advantages to those who are naturally identified with them and 
can build on this information, even if and precisely when it is not fully correct. In my 
earlier writings, I have implicitly discussed security of energy supply as a justification for 
the German coal subsidies (for example, in Vogelsang, 1982) and universal service for 
justifying subsidies and cross subsidies in U.S. telecommunications (for example, in 
  2Vogelsang, 1998). Today, I want to propose that privatization,  deregulation and 
competition are similar and much more powerful (political or interest group) brands.  As 
the prime example, competition has the full weight of economics since Adam Smith. As 
an interest group brand competition is naturally identified with the new entrants. Thus, 
once the feasibility of competition is established in a regulated industry, the new entrants 
can generate a lot of support from the public, the regulators and antitrust authorities. On 
the other hand, the incumbent carriers can defend themselves with universal service or 
carrier of last resort branding.    
 
2. Examples of Reforms: What Happened? 
2.1 Introduction 
Network utilities have special properties that make them targets of government 
interference in the form of public ownership, regulation and antitrust policies. With the 
exception of mobile telephony, there is often natural monopoly of end-user access, which 
therefore becomes a bottleneck or essential facility for competitors.  There are economies 
of scope in supply between different infrastructures and services. Sunk costs are most 
important for access but are by no means negligible elsewhere. Network effects on the 
demand side include bandwagon effects from network externalities (Rohlfs, 2001, and 
Faulhaber, 2002). Competition has become feasible due to access and interconnection 
possibilities and their regulation and through demand growth. 
On a time line, attempts for network utility reforms in the U.S. have started in a feeble 
way already in the 1950s and 1960s, when microwave transmission for long-distance 
telecommunications started to play a role and equipment suppliers challenged AT&T’s 
  3absolute monopoly on telephone sets. However, the reforms only received momentum in 
the 1970s, culminating in the liberalization of the airline industry in 1978 and its 
subsequent total deregulation. Although the liberalization and deregulation movement for 
competitive industries (airlines and trucking; to some extent railroads) was different from 
network utilities, it affected those by setting an example and jump-starting a movement. 
In contrast to the U.K., the U.S. developed no systematic and comprehensive reform 
approach to its regulated industries. Deregulation and liberalization in a number of 
industries could therefore start at the same time that social regulation of health and 
environmental issues took off and grew in a major way. 
Rather than providing a coherent history of network utility restructuring, I will 
concentrate on a few examples, which reflect my pre-knowledge and biases. They contain 
successes and failures, where the failures require specific explanations. This holds 
particularly for failures that produced essentially no winners. 
2.2 Telecommunications 
2.2.1 General issues 
Telecommunications is the quintessential network industry, in which all users are 
connected with each other via a network of networks. Coming from a vertically 
integrated monopoly network, the U.S. has experienced a proliferation of other networks, 
vertical and horizontal separation of the incumbent AT&T, the emergence of new types 
of networks and the beginning convergence of telecommunications with the 
communications and information industries.  The institutional reform of the sector was at 
the heart of these changes. From the wealth of reform components we only pick the 
  4deregulation of telecommunications equipment, the liberalization of the long-distance 
market and the attempts to introduce competition in local telephony. We thereby touch 
only marginally on mobile telephony, cable TV, the Internet and the reforms in spectrum 
assignment and spectrum management. 
2.2.2 Deregulation of terminal equipment  
Since AT&T (Bell) had originally developed the telephone system, it is not surprising 
that it started out as a vertically integrated company that offered the network services 
along with equipment manufacture.  It is also understandable that this lasted beyond its 
economic usefulness, as long as AT&T maintained a virtual monopoly of telephone 
services. The vertical integration was reemphasized by rate-of-return regulation that 
could at least be partially circumvented by producing unregulated along with regulated 
services. However, because AT&T only offered standardized equipment to its subscribers 
and since it charged prices well above costs for it, pressure from entrepreneurs arose 
already in the 1950s and 60s to offer alternative or value added equipment. AT&T’s 
insistence on network integrity as a defense for its absolute monopoly of equipment 
dragged out equipment liberalization for about a decade but ultimately was shown to be 
empty or, at least, easily achievable with less restrictive means, and so equipment was 
liberalized and totally deregulated by 1980. AT&T was already offering equipment 
through a separate subsidiary (Western Electric) so that full vertical separation of the 
network monopoly from equipment manufacturing was not decreed until the AT&T 
breakup in 1984 (the Modified Final Judgment or MFJ).  
Since equipment manufacture is a diverse and potentially competitive industry, the 
liberalization of the equipment market was an immediate success and has never been 
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lower prices ever since then. Looking at Lucent, Nortel and other equipment 
manufacturers today one might, however, get the impression that the liberalization and 
deregulation of telecommunications equipment was a short-term success and a long-term 
failure. While this is most probably the wrong conclusion, its mere possibility may 
prevent us from drawing mistaken conclusions elsewhere (such as for airlines or long-
distance telephony). 
2.2.3 Long-distance telephony: Success under vertical separation 
Competition in long-distance telephony can originally be pinpointed to the emergence of 
microwave technology that confronted AT&T’s cross-subsidized price structure. While 
microwave transmission was already used during WWII, its competitive impact became 
first clear, when large telecommunications users wanted to apply it to their company-
internal telecommunications needs. AT&T was able to prevent this use for about a 
decade, then its further use for specialized carriers for another decade and, finally its 
competitive use for the general public for another few years. What has emerged here is a 
general pattern for incumbents to use the regulatory process to retard change that is 
against their perceived interest. However, the small victories achieved this way may lead 
to an ultimately big defeat, in this case the breakup of AT&T in 1982-84, in which long-
distance telephony was separated from the local monopolies.  
The MFJ has been the great U.S. experiment with vertical separation of network 
monopolists. It was deemed necessary, among others, because local telephony was 
perceived to be a natural monopoly, while long-distance services were viewed as 
potentially competitive. Since long-distance services need local telephone calls as 
  6essential inputs, the local monopolies had to be providing bottleneck access to the long-
distance companies. This had proved to be contentious and created conflicts of interest 
and the accusation of monopolization during the 1970s, leading to the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s lawsuit against AT&T. The breakup occurred by consent decree.
3 As a result, 
the court (Judge Greene) was in charge of its execution and acted as a third, very 
powerful regulator (besides the Federal Telecommunications Commission [FCC] and the 
state public utility commissions [PUCs]). From 1984 onwards long-distance telephony 
developed into an increasingly competitive industry. AT&T’s share in long-distance 
revenues fell from about 86% in 1984 to about 42% in 1998 and simultaneously the HHI 
among long-distance companies fell from 8,200 to 2,600 (Kaserman and Mayo, 2002, p. 
517). Competition was both facilities-based and resale-based. While high local access 
charges initially kept long-distance charges high, they no longer distorted the competition 
between other long-distance carriers and AT&T.  
The buildup of excess capacity through several full-sized long-distance networks became 
obvious already in the 1980s but did not lead to excessive competition, as long as product 
differentiation and brand names allowed for substantial margins above marginal costs. 
That episode is by now history and certainly has been replaced by fierce competition 
today. In 1989 AT&T was relieved from rate-of-return regulation and came under fairly 
flexible price caps. 1995 its prices were fully deregulated. The record of long-distance 
competition received generally favorable reviews from economists (surveyed in 
Kaserman and Mayo, 2002), but dissenters led by MacAvoy (1996) pointed to evidence 
that oligopolistic network competition might have led to collusive outcomes by the early 
1990s. A major reason for the mixed review is that a large percentage of price reductions 
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local carriers. Thus, while AT&T’s average revenues per minute fell by about 69% 
between 1984 and 1998 the average revenues net of access charges fell by only about 
44% (Economides, 2003).   
The 1990s brought attempts by the long-distance companies to provide local access 
services to themselves and local end-user services to others, and the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act) played to the desire of the large local exchange companies to 
reintegrate vertically into long-distance services. This begged the question if vertical 
separation had caused a severe loss of economies of scope. While no concrete evidence 
has been found, price and productivity trends in U.S. telecommunications are more 
favorable before than after the 1984 breakup. Thus, Phillips (2002) finds that real prices 
of telephone services decreased by 1.27% annually during the 1959-1979 period, while 
they only decreased by 0.69% per year during 1980-2000. This may indicate that the 
vertical relationships between separated long-distance and local exchange carriers were 
associated with high transaction costs. If the rules had been simply biased against either 
party not both would want to integrate vertically. It is thus not clear if vertical separation 
gave the U.S. telecommunication sector an advantage over countries with continuing 
integration of their incumbent dominant firms, such as the UK and the rest of Europe.  
The last few years have led to decreasing prices and a deterioration of the profitability of 
long-distance telephony. The financial outlook of the industry continues to be bleak. In 
my view, this can be attributed to excess capacity from the fiber optics revolution 
combined with (a) commoditization of long-distance telephony, (b) mobile substitution 
and (c) the increasingly successful entry of local exchange companies in the long-
  8distance area. Since the networks are sunk, none of these factors is going to disappear 
soon. Does this mean that long-distance telephony reform has finally become a failure? 
So far there are no signs that customers will suffer any disadvantages. That could only 
occur if local exchange companies were able to remonopolize those markets, something 
that will most likely be prevented by antitrust laws, sunk investments and mobile 
competition. 
Thus, judged at this point, long-distance competition has been a moderate success. 
However, the general public perception that competition is responsible for the large price 
reductions experienced over time is only partially true. Competition revealed the large 
rent transfers that were contained in long-distance access charges and, hence, these were 
reduced in the political process.  
2.2.4 Local telephony and the 1996 Act 
Like long-distance competition local competition was also triggered by a combination of 
price distortion and technical innovation. The price distortion came from the universal 
service policy of subsidizing local telephone subscriptions (on a flat rate basis) through 
long-distance access charges. Since those access charges originally were a multiple of the 
long-run incremental costs of access, they invited local access bypass for larger long-
distance users. The technological innovation was the optical fiber ring installed by 
competitive access providers (CAPs). The fiber rings were later copied by incumbent 
local exchange companies. So, although the CAPs were originally cherry pickers, they 
helped improve the efficiency of the incumbent networks.   
  9While CAPs were the forerunners of local competition and while attempts of true local 
competition started in a few states, such as New York and Illinois in the early 1990s,
4 it 
was the 1996 Act that was supposed to jump-start local competition in a big way  
•  by establishing obligations for local resale with a wholesale discount,  
•  by providing various unbundled network elements, with which new competitors could 
construct networks through leasing arrangements at long-run incremental cost, 
•  by providing for reciprocal interconnection arrangements between competing local 
networks, 
•  by making entry of the large local exchange companies dependent on progress in 
local competition in their territories (Section 271 of the 1996 Act). 
In spite of very pro-competitive enforcement by the FCC and most state PUCs, the big 
push forward did not happen. After over six years since passage of the 1996 Act the new 
competitors have gained little over 12% market share in terms of access lines but less 
than 10% in terms of revenues (ALTS, 2003). While this looks like a small gain, it is 
about the same as in the long-distance market over the 1984-1989 period. However, most 
of local service competitors do not provide their own lines. Over two-thirds of more than 
300 competitive local exchange companies operating in 2000 have disappeared by 2003 
(ALTS, 2003). Some more promising competitors have gone bankrupt, but may emerge 
more strongly from Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.
5 Since most of local competition 
takes place in the business market and since local residential markets have traditionally 
been cross subsidized by business services and long-distance services, one can conjecture 
that prices for business users have declined but official data are missing.  
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services continue to be priced below costs in many, particularly rural, areas. Second are 
continuing natural monopoly and bottleneck problems. Third, by making universal 
service charges explicit, the 1996 Act helped reduce long-distance access charges, 
thereby eliminating an incentive for backward vertical integration. Fourth, the FCC’s 
enforcement of the 1996 Act was legally challenged and therefore partially in limbo until 
2002. At the same time, an extreme unbundling policy was demanded by the FCC. This 
required organizational and network changes that the local exchange companies could 
drag out. The local collocation required for loop unbundling is very costly.
6 All parties 
underestimated these difficulties. The long-distance carriers underestimated the 
continuing barriers to entering local markets, even with entry help. And the Bell 
operating companies underestimated the regulatory hurdles before being able to enter 
long-distance markets. These hurdles were a direct function of the difficulties of the long-
distance carriers to enter the local markets. Universal service policy calls for continuing 
regulatory interference. Last, continued regulation of end-user prices by state PUCs 
prevented price rebalancing in accordance with costs. This led to a particular failure for 
competition to develop for residential users. Thus, the failure to establish local 
competition quickly is itself a combination of regulatory quagmire and genuine entry 
barriers in the form of high duplication costs under low penetration. 
The future of the FCC’s entry help to local competitors is in doubt at this time, as the 
FCC has been switching from a balanced approach towards service and infrastructure 
competition to favoring more facilities-based competition. Already, the incumbent local 
exchange carriers are losing lines to new competitors, to mobile services and to 
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unsuccessful intramodal local competition to intermodal competition in specific local 
areas.    
2.2.5 Conclusions on telecommunications 
In all three examples the reform took substantial time from the beginning of the events 
that triggered them. Meanwhile the incumbent enjoyed continued monopoly power, 
something that Owen and Braeutigam (1978) ascribe to the U.S. regulatory process in 
general. 
Telecommunications is the major network industry, where technical change played a 
crucial role in some reforms, but not obviously in all, such as telecommunications 
equipment (or did it?).  
All reforms, however, started from distorted prices that triggered competition. The early 
success of long-distance competition and delay of local competition are probably both 
explained by the lack of rebalancing of prices as a result of cost reduction in long-
distance services and cost increases in local services. Regulators could therefore 
potentially have avoided some reforms and accelerated others by pricing more in line 
with costs. Why did they not? The lack of price rebalancing in telecommunications in the 
past is intimately connected with the policies of state PUCs, who did not want to raise 
local service prices, and with the problem of universal service. To some extent, this 
continues, although the 1996 Act has put universal service on a more rational basis. But, 
at the same time, universal service policy has expanded and has become highly 
complicated.  
  12The U.S. telecommunications sector today provides a bleak picture from the perspective 
of investors and telecommunications companies. Telecommunications carriers are said to 
face a debt spiral, and investment advisors have, during all of 2002, advised against the 
competitive telecommunications segment in a wholesale fashion. The only slightly 
brighter spot is the monopolistic segment, consisting of incumbent local exchange and 
cable television companies. From the customer perspective the picture is somewhat 
different. In the competitive sector customers enjoy low prices and ample choice, while 
prices in monopolistic markets vary by the regulatory impact. Thus, the economists’ 
conclusions need to be differentiated. Current industry profits or the lack thereof, 
however, matter for society because they are part of the surplus and because they are 
important for future investments.  
Looking at the reform history over more than 25 years now makes me believe that 
telecommunications is not an inherently unstable industry but rather that the late 1990s, 
through the Internet hype, provided for a unique investment optimism that led to excess 
capacities and financial failures that burden the future for some time. This may, however, 
reflect on the public view of the working of competition in this sector. 
2.3 Electricity 
2.3.1 General issues 
In contrast to telecommunications, the U.S. has not been at the forefront of electricity 
market reforms. Rather, these have been led by the U.K., Chile, Argentina, Norway, 
Alberta (Canada) and Victoria (Australia). The crucial early academic inputs, however, 
were American. Joskow and Schmalensee (1983) for the first time systematically 
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Schweppe proposed real time pricing that has influenced the specific shortrun nodal 
pricing approach widely used in the U.S. today and proposed by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) as the national standard.
7 
Electricity regulation in the U.S. is, like telecommunications, divided between federal 
and state regulation. The federal regulator, the FERC, is responsible for interstate high 
voltage transmission and for wholesale transactions, while the state regulators are in 
charge of generation, low voltage distribution and intrastate transmission. In practice, 
there is an overlap of regulatory reach of both. In case of conflicts, the FERC can use 
federal preemption to solve conflicts in its favor. 
2.3.2 Federal issues 
The Pubic Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) of 1978 led to independent generation 
at a time when public utilities had investment problems due to lack of demand growth 
and nuclear cost overruns and delays. The entrance of small qualified generation facilities 
(QFs) was also driven by comparatively high prices received from public utilities as 
stipulated by the law (claimed to be at avoided costs). At the same time, state PUCs 
disallowed many new (nuclear) power plants built by traditional electric utilities, while 
other nuclear plants had huge cost overruns and turned out to be unreliable. As a result of 
the success of QFs and failure of utility investments in generation, state PUCs started to 
use competitive bidding for new generation rather than simply license the building of 
new plants by electric utilities (Watkiss and Smith, 1993).  
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPact) allowed generation competition beyond QFs, but 
did not allow for retail wheeling. Rather, it required third party access to transmission 
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shorter lead times and new technical developments favored medium-sized gas fired 
power stations over large coal fired stations, particularly in California. 
While restructuring of the electricity industry was largely done by state PUCs, the FERC, 
until 1999, only provided the conditioning feature of open access transmission. Its 1996 
Order 888 on open access required transmission owners to provide access to others 
“comparable” to themselves (not as strictly as 1996 Act in telecommunications). 
However, through its 1999 Millenium Order, the FERC directly aimed at restructuring 
the industry by demanding regional transmission organizations (RTOs) to be formed 
according to some presepecified criteria. This would require transmission owners either 
to relinquish their managerial power over their assets or to divest these assets altogether 
and become shareholders in a specialized vertically separated transmission entity.  Most 
recently, the FERC has embarked on a standardized market design for transmission 
markets throughout the U.S., but this is still in the rulemaking stage     
2.3.3 State issues: The example of California 
Motivation for California’s reforms  
In the early 1990s California had among the highest electricity prices in U.S. The high 
costs were due to cost overruns with nuclear plants and to long-term fixed price contracts 
of utilities with small generators. At the same time, the favorable British experience with 
electricity restructuring seemed to show a way to substantial cost and price reductions. In 
this situation, California was the first U.S. state to embark on an ambitious electricity 
sector reform. Rather than learn from the British example, however, the state legislature 
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had never been tried before and putting them together to a complicated whole.  
California reform design  
The California reform design contained a complicated set of ingredients: 
•  An independent system operator (CAISO) was created to solve the complex real-time 
problems due to nonstorability of electricity and balancing problems in electricity 
markets (loop flow, voltage and frequency control, reserve requirements etc.). 
Making the entity independent begs the question of its objectives and incentive 
structure along with the problematic separation of ownership and control of 
transmission assets.  
•  A power exchange (PX) was created for daily trades. The use of the PX was 
obligatory for main public utilities (until the crisis peaked). The two-tier structure of 
market organization raised the problem of coordination between CAISO and PX. The 
CAISO was responsible if trades in the PX would exceed transmission capacity 
(imbalance market). The CAISO chose a two-zone congestion pricing system instead 
of nodal pricing that would have incorporated the complexity of actual transmission 
congestion and revealed the true transmission bottlenecks. In 1999, the PX started to 
run a forward market, which never really took off because the large utilities feared 
that long-term contracts would be viewed as imprudent (rather than the opposite!), 
because it could expose them to high prices if spot prices took a dive and because 
they could then lose their customers to new entrants, who would price low.
8  
•  The main IOUs (investor owned utilities as opposed to municipal electric utilities) 
had to sell off generation capacity, and they sold virtually all their gas fired plants to 
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9 Although these new companies ended up each owning only 6-8% of 
the state’s generation capacity, they could exercise market power in the day-ahead 
markets. This possibility of market power of (non-colluding) firms with small market 
shares in markets with extremely inelastic demands and lumpy supply is a new 
discovery from these markets. In particular, Borenstein et al. (2002) estimate that 
market power increased wholesale electricity prices on average by about 33% in 
June-October 1998 and by almost 100% in June-October 2000. In the latter period, 
this was associated with productive inefficiency of about $ 350 million, which 
represents about 4% of electricity expenditure.  
•  Through the restructuring, the main IOUs had essentially become owners of 
transmission and distribution capacity that were regulated by open access. Their main 
business therefore was the sale of electricity to final users. Although there was open 
entry into this marketing business, the IOUs’ end-user prices continued to be 
regulated. They had to sell under a carrier-of-last resort obligation at a standard offer 
price, which was 10% below the pre-restructuring price. This price reduction was 
financed partially through low-interest bonds that lowered the utilities’ cost of capital 
and partially through a surcharge on customers of incumbents and entrants until the 
bonds were fully repaid. Since the resulting total charges were, at the time of 
restructuring, expected to be considerably above the incumbent utilities’ costs, the 
resulting surplus would be used to pay for stranded costs until the stranded costs 
would be fully paid off or until April 1, 2002, at the latest (Blumstein et al., 2002). As 
it turned out, entrants could not effectively compete against the standard offer, at 
which incumbents had to sell to end-users.  
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possibly due to overcapitalization under rate-of-return regulation (the Averch-
Johnson effect). Demand responses to capacity shortages were therefore minimal, 
while they could have been achieved through peak-load pricing without an increase in 
average prices. The lack of demand response enhanced the exercise of market power, 
which could have been prevented by long-term contracts for electric power in 
wholesale markets (see Vogelsang, 1987, Allaz and Vila, 1993, and, for experience in 
the U.K., Newbery, 2000).  
To sum up, the California reform design totally concentrated on short-term supply 
benefits and longer term demand benefits, while neglecting long-term supply issues and 
short-term demand responses. The naïve expectation was that competitive prices would 
result at levels well below regulated prices.  
Consequences of the California reforms  
The California reforms worked reasonably well for the first two to three years, during 
which the wholesale price was below the standard offer price plus surcharges.
10 It 
nevertheless turned out that downstream competition failed totally as a result of the 
standard offer by the incumbents, who also benefited from their goodwill and from 
customer switching costs. In late 1999 and during the course of 2000, adverse issues 
arose. A severe draught in the Pacific Northwest implied that hydro imports from there 
had to be cut, resulting in increased generation from gas fired stations, which resulted in 
increased gas prices and in increased prices for NOx pollution permits. Lack of 
transmission capacity between northern and southern California and between California 
and eastern states prevented arbitrage opportunities that could have dampened the crisis. 
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demand. 
During and after restructuring, hardly any new generation and transmission capacity 
came on stream. The lack of new capacity in California is partially the result of the 
uncertain and protracted restructuring process that new generators wanted to see 
completed, before committing funds. The PURPA experience in California had shown 
that electricity supply could be generated outside traditional utilities. However, this 
usually occurred under long-term contracts. Therefore there existed no empirical basis 
about how real-time pricing would influence investments (Blumstein et al., 2002). By the 
end of 2000, the crisis had led to extremely high spot prices, resulting in a liquidity crisis 
for the two largest IOUs and to their inability to buy all required electricity. In the face of 
threatened outages and IOU bankruptcies there was an exceedingly slow fix of the 
problem. Politicians and regulators either believed the crisis would quickly go away or, 
more probably, they were too timid to respond by adjusting retail prices. The electricity 
reform had been sold to the public as a way to reduce electricity prices and, therefore, 
stiff price increases did not fit into the political picture. At the peak of the crisis, in 
February 2001, Governor Gray Davis was quoted as saying, “If I had wanted to increase 
prices I could have solved the crisis in twenty minutes.” Rather, the crisis lasted for 
another six months, leading to a number of planned power outages and lost production in 
other sectors, due to interruptible power contracts. 
The crisis ultimately was resolved  
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state of California, and through the establishment of solvency through state 
guarantees and the assumption of state ownership of parts of the transmission system,  
•  through new generation capacity coming (back) on stream, 
•  through demand management that provided incentives for lower consumption 
(general price increases coupled with rebates for reduction of consumption well 
below previous levels) and  
•  through a change in the adverse weather conditions and a weakening economy. 
Conclusion from the California disaster and beyond 
The California problems should not distract the view from some positive aspects of 
electricity reform experience in the U.S. One main purpose of the reforms was a 
reduction in generation costs, due to competition. Data indicate that, over the 1981-1999 
period partial productivity measures of generation increased in states with competition 
over states without. For example, plant heat rates fell by 2-2.5% following vertical 
separation of ownership. At today’s fuel prices that would translate into about $ 4 billion 
savings per year nationwide (Wolfram, 2003). Whether these and other productivity 
changes translate into total factor productivity increases and whether they make up for 
increased transaction costs is an open question. 
While California was having its reform meltdown, other U.S. areas, such as New 
England, New York, and Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) were more 
successful with a more centralized ISO structure designed to recapture lost vertical 
integration economies (Wilson, 2002). For example, Sutherland (2003) claims that, 
compared to a sample of non-restructured states, consumers in the five PJM states 
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alone. Despite the high costs of the crisis to California, the experience therefore suggests 
that decentralized regulation with a laboratory of the states has worked to some extent. 
California influenced other U.S. states to restructure but they did not follow the same 
model. Thus, the response to the California crisis was twofold. States with ongoing 
reforms strengthened those to avoid California pitfalls. Other states, with the exception of 
Texas, postponed or canceled any planned electricity reforms at the state level. In 
addition, the FERC went in to strengthen precautions against the use of short-term 
monopoly power in generation and to increase interstate transmission coordination and 
transmission capacity. 
Crew and Kleindorfer (2001) see the California electricity crisis as a problem of (a) 
piecemeal policies, (b) ignorance of experience by others and (c) lack of concern for nuts 
and bolts.  
•  An example of piecemeal policies is the lack of coordination between upstream spot 
pricing and downstream price caps and default service obligation.
11 Politicians 
cherish price reductions but even more abhor price increases. This made them neglect 
the vertical issues. There was a naiveté in the mandated price reductions for 
residential consumers. The IOUs faced a truncated price distribution with a possible 
squeeze. If wholesale prices were high IOUs would have to supply at the standard 
offer price. If wholesale prices were low, they would have to compete with entrants at 
the spot wholesale price plus other costs. 
•  The U.K. experience with market power was totally neglected, possibly because of 
the small market shares of the various generators in California. In the long run, there 
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capacity versus restricting capacity investment. The latter is likely only if entry is 
restricted (e.g., in transmission).  
•  Nuts and bolts were neglected in the lack of peak-load pricing and smart metering (a 
problem for U.S. in general). This was topped by a lack of capacity forecasts, a lack 
of consideration of low demand elasticities and a lack of hedging. At the very latest, 
when selling their power plants at unexpectedly high prices, utilities should have 
expected high prices for generation (Kahn, 2001). Also, economic theory would 
suggest large effects of forecasting errors in industries with inelastic supply and 
demand. 
In the end, the disaster was the result of a combination of bad design combined with a 
stretch of unlikely adverse (and partially correlated) events. 
2.3.4 Conclusions on electricity reforms 
What are the main economic benefits of electricity competition? They are potential cost 
savings and demand responsiveness in generation, a better mix of generating facilities 
and a reduction in markups for final users. The potential benefits also include faster 
introduction of new technologies. As long as transmission and distribution are natural 
monopolies, coordination problems between generation, transmission and distribution are 
counteracting these benefits. These coordination problems can be solved in the short term 
through real time nodal pricing, provided no market power is exercised by generators 
(and transmission entities). Long term investment problems are only partially dealt with 
so far. If anything, the high expectations from electricity reforms would have to be 
fulfilled through investment in cheaper capacity. However, the problem that generation 
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anywhere. 
In contrast to telecommunications, where cross-subsidies from long-distance services to 
local services enabled long-distance competition, there are no apparent cross-subsidy 
issues in electricity. Rather, price rigidity and pricing below full costs in the past caused 
stranded costs that are reflected in the difference between the historic costs of an 
incumbent and the forward-looking costs of an entrant. Under continued monopoly, 
stranded costs would have little significance beyond intergenerational cross subsidization. 
However, their very existence was revealed by competitive entry pressure under the then 
ruling regulated electricity prices.  
In contrast to telecommunications, no major technical breakthroughs have occurred in the 
electricity sector that would explain sector restructuring. Rather, to the extent that 
technology has played a role, it has been the overestimation of the efficiency of known 
technologies and the underestimation of their environmental impact that led to a 
reduction in perceived scale economies in generation. Given the long lead times and long 
life of power plants, the overestimation led to an overshooting without the possibility to 
undo the damage. The new situation made competition in generation appear feasible but 
that did not hold for transmission and distribution, where strong natural monopoly 
properties persisted. Thus, in order to introduce competition in electricity generation, 
vertical separation of generation from transmission and distribution and/or open access to 
transmission and distribution grids was required.   
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The examples in the telecommunications and electricity industries show some strongly 
positive experiences in markets that have developed competitively through liberalization 
and almost total deregulation. The mildly positive examples involve separation of 
monopoly and liberalized competitive areas with deregulation of the competitive parts. In 
contrast, the failures include liberalization with heavy-handed asymmetric regulation of 
incumbents with respect to end-users and open access of incumbent networks to 
competitors.       
Liberalization almost invariably started with entrepreneurs who tried to overcome 
regulatory entry barriers. Under the multifaceted U.S. regulatory system they were able to 
get a foot in the door and offer services in some restricted geographic or product space. 
The success of these niche entrepreneurs provided the basis for cost-of-regulation studies 
trying to extrapolate the benefits from these niches to the whole industry. Eventually, and 
with the help of new entrants and customer groups envisaging benefits they were able to 
convince regulators, courts and legislators about the benefits of liberalization. Opening 
the door to competition, however, meant that regulation of the incumbent(s) had to be 
changed as well. This took two main forms. The first and most straightforward was 
deregulation of the sector, as it occurred for trucking, airlines and telephone equipment. 
The second was asymmetric regulation of the incumbent, who continued to be regulated 
at the retail level and incurred new regulation for access to its bottleneck facilities.     
Not surprisingly, the successes and failures of reforms in network industries are 
correlated with the time at which they occurred. As a rule, early reforms, such as airlines, 
telecommunications equipment and long-distance telephony, have been more successful 
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the low-hanging fruits are picked first. However, since foreign experience was largely 
unavailable (or was not used, as in the case of electricity), U.S. regulators and legislators 
had to learn how to reform these industries. Later reforms could then benefit from these 
experiences. That seems to have happened only to a limited extent. On the contrary, the 
consequences derived from the success of earlier reforms seem to have been the belief 
that the other fruits were also hanging low. 
The examples show that markets work as predicted. Compared to regulation, workable 
competition in airlines, trucking and telecommunications equipment have generated 
substantial net benefits and allowed for complete deregulation.  Vertical separation of the 
competitive segment has also been successful in efficiency improvements and 
deregulation of long-distance telephony (roughly between 1984 and 1996). However, the 
presence of monopoly upstream or downstream and dominant vertically integrated firms 
have caused problems in local telephony and electric utilities, where rent transfers have 
been substantial, relative to efficiency gains. All examples have in common that vertical 
relationships are paramount to successful competition in network utilities. 
The longer-lived and sunk the assets employed by incumbents, the more likely it is that 
reforms reflect attempts to undo past mistakes and are therefore more related to a 
redistribution of rents from sunk costs than to superior competitive entry. Since long-term 
contracts are a sunk investment, all these costs were largely sunk and therefore not about 
to change with liberalization (Borenstein, 2002).  
 
  253. Some Explanations for reforms and their success  
3.1 Why did reforms occur? 
While there had been attempts before at reforming regulation and while regulation has 
perceivably changed over time, the reforms that matter for us all started with some 
liberalization. It was the pressure of new competitors to be allowed in the market and of 
customer groups seeing the benefits of such competition that triggered it all.
12 These 
benefits were primarily substantial price reductions compared to those under regulation 
without competition. What differed between the various examples are the reasons for the 
potential price reductions. In long-distance telephony they were technical and demand 
changes that lowered costs for entrants and exhibited less economies of scale than the old 
technologies. This alone would not have sufficed, given that the incumbents’ costs were 
largely sunk. It was the regulatory rigidity of the price structure that made competition 
feasible. In addition, demand growth reduced sunkness.
  
Although technology and demand changes provide a convincing explanation for reforms 
in telecommunications, they are less convincing in trucking, airlines, railroads, natural 
gas and even electricity. Thus, since commensurate reforms occurred in all these 
industries, the technical and demand changes can only explain differences (in sequencing, 
scope and type) between the various industry reforms. In electricity markets the reforms 
were spurred by a sector crisis, due to cost overruns under rate-of-return regulation, to the 
rising impact of environmental regulation and to long-term fuel contracts at high prices. 
Again, that would not have sufficed without the PURPA and the MFJ experience that 
suggested low costs of vertical separation along with the (largely unsubstantiated) belief 
that competition in generation would work wonders. 
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directionality that suggests a reform movement. It would, however, be very coincidental 
if similar technology and demand-related reasons occurred in the various industries. It 
would also be surprising if regulatory snafus would have occurred at about the same time 
in these cases, some of which had been regulated for almost a century. Rather, it suggests 
that something contagious happened that was triggered by events in a subset of the 
industries. This may well have been the technical change in long-distance telephony that 
showed feasible competition and provided competitive pressure. This - along with airline 
and trucking deregulation - has worked as eye openers to spread the competitive disease.   
3.2 What explains success or failure? 
The reforms occur first in industries, where claims for expected efficiency increases from 
deregulation were strongest and most believable (and where there was a group that has a 
lot to gain). This particularly holds for industries that are naturally competitive (trucking 
and airlines) or which experience a lot of technical and demand changes 
(telecommunications). The success in those industries reemphasizes the original claim 
that is then extrapolated to industries where success is less likely. To the extent that the 
claims are believed and the results occur with a lag, one might expect overshooting so 
that reforms occur where they should not or in arrangements that are not viable 
(California electricity reforms).   
The conundrum about the less successful examples is not so much that efficiency gains 
were absent but rather that the formerly dominant interest groups allowed for large rent 
transfers at their expense. This is explainable only either by their loss of political power 
or by a total misjudgment on their part. While the former is plausible, it does not seem to 
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substantially oppose the reforms as shown by the fact that the California electricity 
restructuring and the 1996 Telecommunications Act passed essentially unopposed. 
However, the incumbents only agreed because the reforms were adapted to their 
perceived needs.
13 This made the reforms exceedingly complicated and opaque. Second, 
the Supreme Court has been a protector of regulatory assets under rate-of-return 
regulation.
14 So, in my view, the electric utilities and Bell operating companies 
voluntarily agreed to these reforms, but made a big mistake in doing so. 
The same kind of euphoria is expressed in the California (and other) electricity reform as 
in 1996 Act. Both promised consumers large benefits from competition while shielding 
them (for example, via guaranteed prices) from the risks (Kahn, 2001). Such euphoria 
may be necessary to get big reforms started. However, the net efficiency benefits of 
reforms vary and are not high on average. This implies that care is needed for reforms, 
and the type I/type II errors have to be assessed in detail, where the problem of evaluation 
lies in establishing a proper counterfactual.  
The two main failures, local telephony and California electricity have in common that 
retail competition has not been developing, but the reasons are quite different. In case of 
local telephony, the local loops as remaining bottlenecks hinder competition, even if 
loops can be rented from the incumbents. In the California electricity market it was the 
artificially low regulated price for the incumbent’s services (although that holds to some 
extent for local telephony as well). The standard offer, along with natural advantages for 
large users, seemed to guarantee a Pareto improvement, expressed by unanimity in 
California legislature, with which electricity reform was passed. As with the U.S. 
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strength of a piece of legislation because it hints at excessive compromise.  The two 
examples of failures further have in common that the propaganda of reform (the potential 
entrants) had predicted strong competitive inroads. Such predictions were emphasized by 
the entrants and not contradicted by the incumbents, leading to a lack of precautions 
against the effects of forecasting errors.  
New entrants have to overcome large hurdles against well-known incumbents with 
valuable brand names and service reputation. A major problem with the introduction of 
any retail competition in hitherto monopolistic network industries is that entrants have to 
overcome switching costs and customer inertia. They therefore need to have either 
substantially lower costs than the incumbent or face an incumbent’s prices that are 
substantially above his costs. In general in the network industries, the latter seems to be a 
common phenomenon associated with (often politically motivated) cross subsidization. In 
that sense, selective competition gets a head start, as long as incumbents do not respond 
quickly with price restructuring. Such restructuring, however, is often prevented by 
regulators or not in the interest of incumbents, who fear goodwill losses from the 
accompanying price increases. The rigidity of past regulatory pricing has led to a cross-
subsidization trap, because regulated monopolists need not change politically popular 
price structures in response to cost changes. While cross-subsidization creates and 
maintains powerful interest groups backing the status quo, it also plants the seeds for 
competition in the form of cream skimming. This seed grows particularly strongly if the 
new technologies lack the strong natural monopoly properties of the new ones, as has 
happened in long-distance telephony. 
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competition leads to stranded costs, due to overinvestment or investment in inefficient 
technology/long-term contracts. The reforms start by concentrating on forward-looking 
costs of new entrants as compared to full historic costs of incumbents and largely neglect 
that the forward-looking costs of incumbents (because of large sunk-cost elements) are 
often even lower. When the reform threat becomes real, the incumbents claim stranded 
costs from past investment, the recovery of which has often been granted in exchange for 
their agreement to liberalization. Incumbents have such power because they incurred 
investments in the stranded assets under a rate-of-return regulated regime that entitled 
them to the expectation of a fair rate of return on the assets. The expected cost reductions 
from such liberalization are then attributed to liberalization rather than to bad 
bookkeeping.  
Network utility reforms are shaped by two seemingly opposing forces, competition along 
with liberalization and regulatory persistence. Once the nose of the camel (competition) 
is in the tent, the whole camel follows (Hogan, 2001). In contrast, regulators rarely let 
go.
15 Full deregulation has only occurred in competitive industries (telephone equipment, 
trucking and airlines), while in industries with dominant suppliers and natural monopoly 
characteristics, regulation continues and is influenced by redistributive policies. Those 
are enhanced by the ability to hide costs and burdens in the regulatory process, while 
calling it deregulation (Crew and Kleindorfer, 2001). Deregulation and liberalization are 
separate issues, independent of privatization. Thus, while deregulation may follow the 
liberalization process, it is not an inevitable and definitely not a short-term outcome. 
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to full deregulation. This regulation comes in two forms. First, bottleneck regulation of 
access to and interconnection with the incumbent’s network enhances the feasibility of 
competition. Second, end-user regulation curbs the incumbent’s remaining market power 
vis-à-vis end-users. Asymmetric regulation, while necessary, creates problems of equity 
and efficiency. In particular, incentives for investment by incumbents are usually 
dampened, while investment incentives for entrants can be dampened if bottleneck inputs 
are provided too cheaply. At the same time, the incentives become excessive in the non-
bottleneck areas. Whether this type of regulation has had any influence on the current 
telecommunications sector crisis with excess capacities in fiber optics is an open 
question.
16 In the U.S. the problem with end-user regulation is exacerbated by the fact 
that it is largely controlled by state PUCs, who want to maintain the traditional patterns of 
cross subsidies in spite of liberalization. This holds particularly for residential electricity 
and local telephony. The influence of state regulation is therefore decidedly mixed in 
accelerating and retarding reform. Acceleration occurs through “progressive” PUCs (with 
much to gain from competition); delay occurs through lack of uniformity in solving an 
issue that requires nationwide change (rate rebalancing for Bell system). 
Performance-based regulation has increased pricing flexibility in some areas and thereby 
been conducive to liberalization if only as a concession to make incumbents willing to 
accept sector reforms. The impact of amending or replacing rate-of-return regulation by 
incentive regulation (price caps) is somewhat similar to privatization in the British sense. 
Both increase short-term efficiency incentives. However, both rate-of-return regulation 
and public enterprises had been a commitment device against expropriation and therefore 
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that both devices no longer worked. Rate-of-return regulation prevented innovative 
investment and was associated with the nuclear cost overruns, while public ownership 
dried up investments in British Telecom. The further problem with U.S. style rate-of-
return regulation is that it is not compatible with competition because it reduces the 
incumbent’s cost-reducing incentives and its pricing flexibility. A problem with all 
regulatory reforms with the exception of full deregulation is that they increase the 
regulatory uncertainty perceived by a Bayesian investor.  
3.3 Conclusions on explanations 
Reforms have occurred largely because of price rigidities under regulation. Prices became 
out of line with costs because of political will and because of market changes occurring 
through innovations, swings in world market prices, new environmental regulation and 
the like. Since reforms have to overcome the opposition of former beneficiaries, they 
only occur with a lag. Once successful reforms occur, the former rent transfers are 
revealed. This makes potential competitors look for similar situations in other industries 
or industry segments. Reforms then become contagious. The reforms were staggered, 
because the underlying reasons date at different times. Tipping toward reforms usually 
occurs, when competitive pressures of actual and potential entrants become sufficiently 
high. This pressure makes it impossible for incumbents and other beneficiaries of the past 
to claim that there were no implicit rent transfers.  
Reforms fail, because early successful reforms have raised expectations about what 
competition can achieve. The successful reforms have increased the political value of the 
brand competition. This leads to the political belief in future reform success and the 
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reforms. A strong example of this is the standard offer to residential customers in the 
failed California electricity reform. In the cases of failed reforms the competitive hurdles 
may be too high to achieve competition, and that combines well with the inability of 
regulators to let go. It also appears that the failed reform cases did quite badly in their 
application of performance-based regulation. 
 
4. Conclusions: The new learning?  
4.1 Learning for the U.S. 
Only two years ago, a paper on sector reform in U.S. network utilities would have looked 
differently and would have come to entirely different conclusions. In this assessment I 
may have become victim of the very cognitive biases that I accuse policy makers of. 
However, the last two years provide crucial data points for Bayesian updating.  
What lessons can be learned from the past U.S. experience in avoiding mistakes and 
going for successes? Since (with the possible exception of postal services) there are no 
further network industries to be reformed, the advice can only be directed at 
improvements in the already reformed industries. By now, it is clear that new reforms 
will be approached more carefully for some time. In the U.S. electricity industry the 
restructuring in a number of states has been postponed or scrapped. Those, in which 
reforms took place, will now have to show long-term benefits before others are going to 
follow. 
Is total deregulation the answer to failed reforms, as some authors like Crandall (1999) 
suggest? It may well be. The question, however, is “When and where?” Since successful 
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deregulation as a solution to reform problems or as a way to avoid such problems 
altogether. Benefits from total deregulation include an obvious simplicity and a lack of 
mistakes from contradictions in a reform packet. They also potentially include the 
commitment power of deregulation. However, the short-term irreversibility is also the 
greatest danger because total deregulation will only work if competition is either 
sustainable from the beginning or if its emergence over time cannot be prevented by the 
incumbent (or there are no rents, such as in U.S. railroads). It is obvious that competition 
worked in the successful reform cases. How can one know that it will work in others? 
Normatively one could suggest a two-step procedure. If competitive pressure emerges, 
one should liberalize while simultaneously eliminating regulatory distortions. The 
problem with this suggestion is the positive issue that regulatory distortions benefit 
certain groups that would not give them up without fight. Making the implied subsidies 
explicit is rarely going to help because the benefiting groups would not get the necessary 
political support, once it is clear that they receive these benefits. Thus, it appears that 
competition is the necessary discovery process for regulatory distortions as well as 
efficiency enhancing in its own right.      
As the economic theory of regulation has brought out, wealth distribution is more 
important for understanding economic policies than efficiencies. The proper place for 
efficiency is to aid distributional policies. While voters behave with reasonable rationality 
the outcomes can be quite inefficient. Part of this is due to lack of information by all 
parties and asymmetric information. Competitive pressure exerted on a regulated 
monopolist reveals otherwise hidden rents that are captured by winning interest groups. 
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weight against the old regulatory regime. Thus, even though efficiency in the traditional 
economic sense may not be improved by the resulting reforms, the political efficiency 
will be. 
4.2 Lessons for other countries 
Many of the network industries in other countries face problems that are similar to those 
of the U.S. Those foreign industries that have not been reformed yet might learn from the 
U.S. experience. Since most countries with a comparable institutional, geographic and 
economic endowment already have reformed their network utilities, they may only be 
able to learn for future adjustments and reforms of reforms.   
In some cases, other countries have done better and therefore have better prospects than 
the U.S. A California electricity disaster is unlikely to happen anywhere else. The 
prospects for competition in local telephony are not much brighter elsewhere than in the 
U.S., but that seems to be the nature of the beast. Generally, European countries seem to 
have less distorted local telephone charges and less extreme universal service policies 
than the U.S. (Cherry and Bauer, 2002). This would improve prospects for unbiased 
competition, although geographic rebalancing is still way off.  
One major learning is not to expect Pareto improvements from reform. Rather, there will 
be winners and losers. This will make reforms that do not benefit the dominating interest 
groups politically more difficult. In that respect, privatization in the British sense 
provides an additional instrument because the sale price for the public enterprise can be 
used to benefit otherwise losing groups. A major problem, however, is that the one-time 
opportunity of privatization has already occurred in most cases. 
  35While privatization allows for a clean slate, vertical separation or horizontal divestiture –
although each would often be beneficial - is difficult to achieve with it. Separation 
requires enough time, cooperation of management and market values for the firm’s 
assets. 
The U.S reform examples and their discussion yielded some answers to our two initial 
questions about sector crises and political branding. First, the crises should influence our 
approach to current and future reforms. Second, the political process in the U.S. favors 
solutions in the name of competition without enough analysis. This could make learning 
difficult and may lead to swings in the public evaluation of competition if failed reforms 
give competition a bad name.  
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1 Some sale of public enterprises has occurred in the U.S. railroad industry (Conrail, 
which had been nationalized in the early 1970s to save it from the Penn Central 
bankruptcy) and some municipal electric utilities but some public enterprises have also 
spread, when municipal utilities moved into telecommunications. 
2 Bortollotti et al. (2002) provide evidence that regulatory changes are more important 
than ownership changes in explaining performance of restructured telecommunications 
sectors. 
3 The other main basis for the suit was the vertical problem of equipment manufacturing. 
The name Modified Final Judgment resulted, because it legally was drawn up as a 
modification of AT&T’s 1956 consent decree. 
4 For the history of this local competition see Vogelsang and Mitchell (1997). 
5 As done in official statistics, we treat broadband access as separate from local 
telecommunications. Broadband access is characterized by inter-modal competition, with 
cable TV companies having over 60% of the market and incumbent local exchange 
companies about 30%, competitive local exchange companies about 3% and satellite TV 
the rest.   42
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Collocation means that competitors can locate their own equipment in the switching 
offices of the incumbent and thereby interconnect more directly, for example, before a 
call reaches the incumbent’s switch. 
7 This work culminated in Schweppe et al. (1988). 
8 This adverse selection problem of hit-and-run entry is worth further study. It can be 
resolved by back-to-back contracts so that end-users interested in stable prices would 
have to commit to long-term contracts as a condition for load-serving entities to sign 
long-term contracts with generators. 
9 Vertical separation provides market estimates for stranded costs (Kahn, 2001). 
10 In fact, San Diego Gas and Electric, the smallest of the three main IOUs managed to 
pay back its stranded costs in time to escape the standard offer price in 2000 only to find 
out that its severe price increases were revoked by the California regulators. 
11 This ignores earlier bad U.S experience with price moratoria analyzed in Isaac (1991). 
12 The breakup of AT&T was additionally triggered by its desire to get into other 
markets, such as the computer business (in which it failed miserably). 
13 Barbara Cherry (in personal communication) stated that interest groups concentrate on 
their perceived most important items of a reform and neglect others that may turn out to 
be important. 
14 Sidak and Spulber (1997) question this under the heading of “deregulatory takings.” 
15 This is the tar baby effect claimed by Kahn (2001). It is based on McKie (1970) and, to 
some extent, on Owen and Braeutigam (1978). 
16 Favoring this view are Hausman and Sidak (forthcoming).  
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